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Abstract This article will explore the representation of certain mental and somatic phenom-
ena in Beckett’s trilogy of novelsMolloy,Malone Dies and The Unnamable, exploring how his
understanding of schizophrenia and psychosis informs his representation of the relationship
between mind and body. It will also examine recent phenomenological and philosophical
accounts of schizophrenia (Louis Sass, Josef Parnas, Shaun Gallagher) that see the condition as
a disorder of selfhood and concentrate in it on the disruption to ipseity, a fundamental and pre-
reflective awareness of self that leads to a loss of ‘grip’ (in the term of Merleau-Ponty) on
concepts and percepts. Beckett’s writing might, it is argued, make such disruptions more
tangible and intelligible. The article will also consider John Campbell’s argument that immu-
nity of the first person to error—Sydney Shoemaker’s foundational philosophical idea that we
cannot misspeak the first person pronoun—is revoked in states of psychosis, and relate such
states to the moments in Beckett’s writing where this immunity is challenged, and quasi-
psychotic experiences represented.
Keywords Samuel Beckett . Schizophrenia . Philosophy . Psychiatry . EugeneMinkowski .
MauriceMerleau-Ponty
It has been frequently observed that there is a strong relationship between the language and
sensibility of the work of writer Samuel Beckett and certain manifestations—both clinical and
cultural—of the psychiatric disorder that is schizophrenia. Beckett is name-checked by Gilles
Deleuze and Felix Guattari in their monumental 1972 work of cultural theory, Anti-Oedipus,
his characters representative of what they call the ‘schizoid’ subject of late capitalism. His
work is also a key test case for psychologist Louis Sass, who sees in it a schizophrenic
sensibility shared by much modernist writing: a form of consciousness consistent with
experiences of depersonalization, dissociation and hyperreflexivity (1992). Beckett scholars
have also touched on the relationship, either observing a literal similarity between Beckett’s
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language and schizophrenic speech disorder (Coe 1983; Keatinge 2008) or seeing in his
characters’ withdrawal from the ‘outer world’ and its materialist transactions what Richard
Begam has called a Bphilosophical analogue^ to the illness (1996, 45; Tahiri 2006). The
persistence of the link between this poet-philosopher of modernity and the mental illness most
often associated (metaphorically and literally) with the modern age has been both a contrib-
uting factor to and a reflection of the cultural capital the condition has accrued. The different
kinds of identification between the condition of schizophrenia and both the form and content
of Beckett’s work testify to the range and heterogeneity of meanings that the terms ‘schizo-
phrenic’ and ‘schizoid’ have in cultural contexts. As Shane Weller has pointed out in his 2009
article on the idea of a ‘schizoid voice’ in Beckett’s work, there is little consensus about what
the term ‘schizophrenia’ means among the Beckett critics who use it (33). Furthermore, this is
not simply a matter of lexical nicety or over-eager theoretical analogy. There is no less debate
in the clinical domain over the conceptual validity of the classification. The work that follows
hopes to complement work in the philosophy of psychiatry engaging with this debate by
offering, via a literary test case, a subjective perspective on experiences that could be seen to
characterize schizophrenia—a perspective that points to underlying relationships between the
affective aspects of the condition and its cognitive and perceptual features.
What claims can literature, and Beckett’s writing in particular, make in this regard? This
paper contends that there is a correspondence between the sorts of mental phenomena (states of
mind, beliefs, disordered perceptions of time, space and body) that Beckett describes and the
experience of psychosis. It suggests that it might be fruitful for the student of Beckett to look at
how both psychologists and philosophers describe what happens to linguistic self-reference
under the pressure of psychotic states, descriptions that can be compared productively to those
in Beckett’s mature work. Beckett’s work in its turn might help clinicians articulate ideas about
the relationship between negative symptoms such as anhedonia and the perceptual deficits of
attention, memory and time perception. To fully understand the founding condition of self-
consciousness, the reflexive awareness which allows us to own our actions, thoughts and
feelings and organize our perceptions and sensations but which eludes strictly materialist
explanations, it may be helpful to employ literary and philosophical models alongside
scientific ones. This paper will make a tentative exploration of these possibilities.
With these considerations in mind, the starting point for this discussion is not Louis Sass’s
comment on Beckett himself, but his philosophically-informed psychology as it pertains to the
experience of schizophrenia. In a 2003 article, ‘Schizophrenia, Consciousness and the Self’,
Sass and his colleague Josef Parnas discuss what philosophers of mind call ipseity—the Bvital
and self-coinciding subject of experience or first-person perspective on the world^ (428). It is
no revelation to suggest that this subject position is often thematized in Beckett’s work in terms
of threats to its continuation, threats similar in many cases to those encountered by the
schizophrenic patient. And what is at stake in looking at the way in which psychotic states
might threaten ipseity is what the philosopher Sydney Shoemaker called the Bimmunity
principle^: the idea of self-reference Bwith immunity to the error of misidentifying the first-
person pronoun^ (1968). Shoemaker contends, following Wittgenstein, that in speaking of
cognitive or experiential states (in Wittgenstein’s examples, ‘I try to lift my arm’, ‘I have
toothache’, ‘I think it will rain’) we cannot misspeak the pronoun ‘I’; it has the authority of
Sass’s vital and self-coinciding subjectivity (557). This, of course, is an immunity that
Beckett’s work appears systematically to dismantle. From the trilogy of novels of the early
1950s, Molloy, Malone Dies, and the aforementioned The Unnamable (hereafter known as the
Trilogy), onwards, his writing is correspondingly concerned with experiences akin to
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psychosis, a state that has been seen by John Campbell and others as offering a counter-
example to the immunity principle (1999; Gallagher and Zahavi 2012, 211).
Even at this fundamental level, there are two dimensions to ipseity for both phenomenological
philosophers such asMerleau-Ponty andMichel Henry and psychologists such as Sass and Shaun
Gallagher (Merleau-Ponty 1989; Henry 1973; Sass and Parnas 2003; Gallagher 2000). There
is Bthematic, explicit or reflective intentionality^ (Sass and Parnas 2003, 429), something akin to
the rational cogito, and there is also a non-reflective, tacit sensibility (Boperative intentionality^ in
Sass and Parnas’s terms) that constitutes our primary presence in the world. The latter can be
identified with what Max Nordau termed coenaesthesis or the Borganic dimly-conscious I^
(1913, 249), the general sense of existence that comes from the sum of bodily feelings and
operates at a level below consciousness proper. Beckett read about this concept in Nordau’s 1892
Degeneration and noted down both the term and this definition, as John Pilling andC. J. Ackerley
have shown (Pilling 1999; Ackerley 2006),1 going on to use the term or its cognates in a number
of his works, and appreciating particularly that the idea encompassed the intrauterine condition
before birth with which he was abidingly concerned. As scholars have observed in recent years
(Moorjani 2000; Oppenheim 2000; Salisbury 2008; Maude 2009), Beckett is arguably as
interested in this kind of awareness, a world of sensation operating at a level of nervous
integration in the brain below its cognitive processes, as he is with the Bself-enclosed Cartesian
theatre^ with which early commentators associated him (Sass and Parnas 2003).
To start with, for the narrator of Beckett’s novel The Unnamable, the process of introspec-
tion seems promising:
How all becomes clear and simple when one opens an eye on the within, having of
course previously exposed it to the without, in order to benefit by the contrast. I should
be sorry, though exhausted personally, to abandon prematurely this rich vein.
He goes on in a more sceptical mode, however:
For I shall not come back to it in a hurry. But enough of this cursed first person, it is
really too red a herring, I’ll get out of my depth if I’m not careful. But what then is the
subject? Mahood? No, not yet. Worm? Even less. Bah, any old pronoun will do,
providing one sees through it. Matter of habit. (1990, 354)
Beckett’s Trilogy becomes dominated by the imagining of situations where the immunity of
the first person pronoun to error comes into question. Shoemaker argues that Bthe rules
governing the use of this word determine once and for all what its reference is to be on any
given occasion of its use, namely, that its reference is to the speaker, and leave no latitude to
the speaker’s intentions in the determination of its reference^ (1968, 559); Beckett’s narrator,
however, relegates it to the status of any avatar, any passing character in his narrative.
A written ‘I’ is of course a different entity to a spoken ‘I’ and can be just as conventional,
fictional or unreliable as any other pronoun or subject. Or almost. Even in an avowed work of
fiction, there is a frisson of intimacy and an assumption of a certain privilege on the part of the
reader in being addressed as ‘you’ and in being party to the directness that a first-person
pronoun betokens. The relentless present tense of much of Beckett’s Trilogy appears at first to
strengthen the proposed connection between the ‘I’ and some entity who was, at least, present
when it was being written and able to determine its reference. Yet as this moment from The
Unnamable shows, for the narrator, at least, it is when he as subject tries to look inside himself
that the term ‘I’ becomes most inadequate and Bcursed^. Saying I—in order to attribute to
oneself certain beliefs, wishes, sensations, and perceptions—is never, as Shoemaker suggests it
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should be, Bclear and simple^. The nature of the Bwithin^ is never elucidated, and the referent
of the first person is, it is suggested, a matter of such uncertainty that one would get
immediately Bout of [one’s] depth^ in hazarding its use. It is not—this is a point the narrator
is firm on—that the subject is particularly complex; what the metaphorical Beye^ of intro-
spection sees, however, cannot be conveyed in language or connected to the most fundamental
level of self-ascription.
There has been much comment on the way in which Beckett uses the idea of the ‘Not I’
although less acknowledgement that this was a term he first encountered in Nordau’s Degen-
eration (C. J. Ackerley 2006 being a notable exception). Nordau uses it to talk of a ‘self for
others’ that he contrasts with the Cartesian self. Beckett, by contrast, reappropriates the term,
using it in his work to refer to the impossibility of labelling and so ascribing consistency and
agency to the self (a dilemma that finds most acute expression in his 1972 play Not I). It is
illuminating, however, to look beyond the abstract labelling of person to the kinds of
experience Beckett depicts in which ipseity is disturbed and the immunity of the pronoun ‘I’
to error challenged—experiences that echo those encountered in psychosis. For Sass,
Gallagher, Henry and others, the fundamental feature of psychotic ipseity disturbance is
hyperreflexivity, defined as forms of exaggerated self-consciousness in which a subject or
agent experiences itself or something that would normally be inhabited as an aspect or feature
of itself as a kind of external object (Sass 2000; Gallagher 2004; Henry 1973). This kind of
altered consciousness is, I would argue, recognizable in Beckett’s trilogy, and the shorter
French fiction (the novellas, Texts for Nothing), where not only a schizoid voice is actualized,
in Weller’s terms, but a range of schizoid mental states as well. The ‘Not I’ cannot be explained
directly, but it is related to such physical and perceptual experiences, dramatized in Beckett’s
fiction and theatre, experiences which make the ontological uncertainty at work more tangible.
Beckett’s Molloy, the narrator of the first novel, feels in the term Beckett borrows from
Nordau, Bcoenaesthetically speaking, […] more or less the same as usual^ (1990, 54), his
operative intentionality intact (more or less) for much of the work despite his growing infirmity
and Bterror-stricken^ state. The same may not be said, however, for the protagonist of Malone
Dies, the second novel of the Trilogy, who seems to experience something akin to psychotic
hyperreflexivity. Sass and Parnas describe the phenomenon where Bwhat might have been
thought to be inalienable aspects of self come to seem separate or detached […] one’s arms or
legs, one’s face, the feelings in the mouth or throat^ (2003, 432). Malone’s body, likewise,
becomes a series of objects which he can no longer govern and which he experiences as
separate and external. His feet, for instance:
…my feet, which even in the ordinary way are so much further from me than all the rest,
from my head, I mean, for that is where I am fled, my feet are leagues away. And to call
them in, to be cleaned, for example, would I think take me over a month, exclusive of
the time required to locate them. […] Is that what is known as having a foot in the grave?
This might be dismissed as a physiological problem, or a problem arising from damage to the
local part of the sensorimotor map in his brain, were he not to go on:
And similarly for the rest. For a mere local phenomenon is something I would not have
noticed, having been nothing but a series or rather a succession of local phenomena all
my life, without any result. (235)
This speaks of an existing failure of moment-to-moment ipseity or sense of existence that also
characterizes psychotic disturbance. Self-coincidence is compromised so completely that the
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narrative convention whereby the ‘I’ is simultaneously subject and object of a first-person
narrative breaks down. Malone’s comment that Bthe subject falls far from the verb and the
object lands somewhere in the void^ (235) ostensibly describes what happens when he dozes
off when writing and the wind turns the pages of his notebook, but seems to apply equally well
to his disintegrating sense of personhood. The Bexaggerated self-consciousness^ characteristic
of a disturbance of operative intentionality means, somewhat ironically, that self-presence
cannot be achieved. Such passages, paving the way for the refusal of the first person itself in
The Unnamable, illustrate what Sass identified in Madness and Modernism as a focus on
hypertrophied self-consciousness common to both modernist writing and the schizophrenic
patient.
Other features of psychotic experience reflected in Beckett’s work also go to the heart of the
assumptions that surround a first-person fictional narrative. Part of the self-presence of ipseity
consists in the tacit assumption of essential experiential differences between a remembered
event and a remembered fantasy—the noetic aspect of consciousness. Shane Weller notes
Beckett’s reading of Ernest Jones on hysteria in this respect, and his transcription of a passage
(in his 1930s note-taking on psychology) about the vividness and saliency of fantasy for the
hysteric to the point where it has an Bequal significance to a real experience^ (2009, 36).
Weller identifies this idea with the late theatre (Not I, Rockaby and Footfalls), where the
boundary between fantasy and reality Bdisintegrates^ (36), but it also preoccupies Beckett
from much earlier in his writing career. Beckett and his narrators are frequently concerned with
their failure to distinguish remembered and imagined events and experiences. Molloy pictures
how cows chew the cud, commenting BBut perhaps I’m remembering things^ as one might
say, BBut perhaps I’m imagining things^ (9). Malone writes at one point, BYou may say it’s all
in my head^, a locution identifying memory with imagination: BYou may say it is all in my
head, and indeed sometimes it seems to me I am in a head and that these eight, no, six, these
six planes that enclose me are of solid bone^ (222). The experience he goes on to describe is
itself suggestive of a hyperreflexive delusion whereby his skull is projected to the limits of his
peripersonal space. The destabilizing of boundaries between external and internal, something
the loss of noetic distinctions between the memory of objective reality and the imagination
might bring about, is a condition that Beckett’s work makes audaciously literal.
Certain distortions of the subject’s ‘grip’ on the conceptual or perceptual field necessarily
result from this condition, as the philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty described in his work on
The Phenomenology of Perception. Perceptions of time and space are commonly distorted for
the schizophrenic patient, as well as aspects of attention such as figure-ground segregation
(Tsakanikos and Reed 2003). Beckett’s narrators also demonstrate such distortions of percep-
tion, which often compromise the immunity principle and so make difficult ascriptions of
ownership to one’s sensations and states of mind. One feature of the failure of basic self-
presence, for instance, is the loss of the aspect of operative intentionality whereby one is
conscious in Sass and Parnas’s words of something rather than something else: the sharpness
or stability with which figures or meanings emerge from and against some kind of background
context (2003, 408). It is well known that Beckett’s early narrators lose this faculty, experienc-
ing the world, as Neary does (after William James) in Murphy as a Bbig blooming buzzing
confusion^– Bground mercifully free of figure^, as Beckett puts it in the terms of the Gestalt
psychologists he was reading at the time (1993, 21; see also Salisbury 2010, 356–58).
A more concrete example of this has been observed by Ulrika Maude, writing about the link
made in Nordau’s Degeneration between ‘hysteria’ (a category that encompassed certain kinds
of psychosis at the time) and literal Bblurred vision^, the hysterical or degenerate artist
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suffering from Btrembling of the eyeball^ who will Bperceive the phenomena of nature
trembling, restless, devoid of firm outline^ (1913, 27). Beckett transcribed this passage in the
reading notes he made in the 1930s, and it is likely to have been in his mind when he described
the Bconfusion^ in Murphy, and—as Maude points out—in the following passage from
Beckett’s novella The Calmative, in which the images of the boy and goat that the narrator
meets become confused to the point where Bsoon theywere nomore than a single blur which if I
hadn’t known I might have taken for a centaur^ (1995, 67; Maude 2013). The contexts for this
Bconfusion^ in Beckett’s work, encountered here as Nordau’s Bblurring^, but elsewhere as aural
Bbuzzing^, usually also encompass generalized problems with attributing salience to what is
seen or heard, as well as with social interaction and affect—all also symptoms found together in
those with schizophrenia. Perceptual difficulties arise consistently in Beckett’s work and are not
just a feature of a weakness of the physical organs of sensory perception but symptomatic of
some general loss of understanding of, or investment in, the organization of the world.
This loss of salience has a fuller treatment in the Trilogy, where the faculties of perception
are also impaired, something directly implicated in the loss of distinction between world and
self. For Malone, the Bsame old noises^ have Bmerged into a single noise, so that all I heard
was one vast continuous buzzing […] The noises of nature, of mankind and even my own,
were all jumbled together in one and the same unbridled gibberish^ (207; my emphasis). Here
space too is no longer seen to be organized according to the subject’s interests. In Merleau-
Ponty’s account, the schizophrenic patient can experience the world as visually Bmurky^
(1989, 336); Malone’s air, a Brestless gloom^, likewise Bgrow[s] murky and dim, thickening is
perhaps the word, until all things blotted out^ (224). Just as for Merleau-Ponty’s schizophrenic
the Bimpulse towards things has lost its energy^ (1989, 336), Malone describes his own
perceptual inertia: BI am not one of those people who can take in everything at a single glance,
but I have to look long and fixedly and give things time to travel the long road that lies
between me and them^ (238).
These descriptions lose their phenomenological richness to some extent in The Unnamable,
the final volume, where they gain a greater level of abstraction, but the protagonist of this
novel also dwells on the impossibility of perceiving or organizing his world, his being even
darker—Bthis ridiculous black which I thought for a moment worthier than the grey to enfold
me^—and he cannot make things meaningful in the face of an overwhelming indifference:
BHere there is no wood, nor any stone, or if there is, the facts are there, it’s as if there wasn’t
[…] I see my place, there is nothing to show it, nothing to distinguish it, from all the other
places^ (366–67). He too is, like Merleau-Ponty’s schizophrenic subject, Bcut off from the
common property world^ towards which most people’s Bexistence rushes^ (1989, 335).
Schizophrenia research has observed a link between anhedonia, an indifference towards both
physical experience and social and emotional contact, and the ability to discern relevant (and
disengage from irrelevant) stimuli in perceptual tests. Beckett’s exploration of profound
indifference as it strikes (or perhaps creeps up on) his protagonists explores its cognitive as
well as emotional implications.
For Merleau-Ponty’s patient, time as well as space is perceived differently from those in the
Bcommon property world^. Not rushing towards this world, they cannot feel time passing with
the same alacrity, just as Malone feels it an age before things can pierce his consciousness and
assume an identity (if they do at all). For people with schizophrenia, time may stop or repeat
itself, being felt to ‘stutter’ (Cutting 1997; Broome 2005), an experience also strikingly
portrayed in Beckett’s fiction and theatre. Vladimir in Beckett’s Waiting for Godot famously
concludes that rather than Pozzo’s watch being broken, BTime has stopped^ (1989, 36), a
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cosmic joke in the context of this play in which stasis and repetitive days make it hard to
discern progression or the change that signals the passing of time. In Beckett’s novels,
however, the phenomenology of apparently disordered time perceptions is rendered more
richly, exploring the interconnectedness of time and space perception.
Eugène Minkowski’s groundbreaking work on the effects of psychopathology on the ability
to perceive and think about space and lived time started with his interest in Bergson, a
philosopher whom Beckett also read and whose terms and ideas appear sporadically in his
writing. Yann Mével has already observed the similarity between some of Minkowski’s
observations on the Bschizoid^ sensibility and those of Beckett’s narrators: a tendency to
organize possessions and space in a geometrically regular fashion; a (related) preoccupation
with plans and arbitrary formal structures (2008, 279–80). The similarities are even more
widespread than Mével indicates. Like Merleau-Ponty, Minkowski teases out the implications
of a Bloss of vital contact with reality [sic]^ (1970, 273). Minkowski seems to invoke here a
version of Sass’s operative intentionality that he calls Bthe fact of ‘me-here-now’ in the life of
the individual^ (274), an awareness of self-presence that schizophrenia attacks, but which in
Minkowski’s view is preserved in other kinds of ‘dementia’, the patient knowing that he or she
is Bhere^, even if he or she cannot identify the location. This foundational awareness, what
Minkowski calls Bthe ‘me-here-now’ Bin a naked state^, is something close to Nordau’s
coenaesthesia. For the schizophrenic, shorn of this awareness, he (in Minkowski’s referent)
Bknows very well where he is but […] doesn’t feel at the place where he is^ and Bthe words BI
exist^ do not have a precise sense for him^ (274).
Beckett’s narrators and characters experience a profound inertia similar to Minkowski’s
schizophrenic patient, who has Bsomething ‘immobile’ about [him]^. Malone describes the life
of Macmann, an avatar for himself: BHe sat and lay down at the least pretext and only rose
again when the élan vital or struggle for life began to prod him in the arse again^ (244).
Beckett here, like Minkowski, uses Bergson’s terms (élan vital) for the vital principle that
represents not just energy and purpose, but also a perceptual Battention to life^. For the most
part, however, Macmann spent:
[…] a good half of his existence […] in a motionlessness akin to that of stone, not to say
three quarters […] a motionless at first skin deep but which little by little invaded, I will
not say the vital parts, but at least the sensibility and understanding. (244)
Minkowski’s anonymous patient, similarly, observes:
I look for immobility. I tend towards repose and immobilization. I also have in me a
tendency to immobilize life around me. Because of this, I love immutable objects, things
which are always there and which never change. Stone is immobile. (Anonymous
patient quoted in Minkowski 1970, 279)
His account of his life and aspirations seems to be a blueprint for Beckett’s Trilogy:
Throughout this day I will try to do nothing at all. I will go for forty-eight hours without
urinating. I will try to revive my impressions of fifteen years ago, to make time flow
backward, to die with the same impression with which I was born, to make circular
movements so as to not move too far away from the base in order not to be uprooted.
This is what I wish.
Although some of these elements are there of necessity for Beckett’s infirm narrators, it
is striking how similarly they live to the prescriptions of this individual. The last story
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that Malone tells himself will be one Bof a stone^, suggesting as several critics have
pointed out the predilection of Beckett’s characters for the inorganic and immobile. His
dying seems increasingly to offer similar impressions to his birth, wallowing in a
Bnourishing murk^ (193), the window of his room Bin a manner of speaking my
umbilicus^ (224) and at the Bconfines of this restless gloom a glimmering as of bones^,
in his head Ball streaming and emptying away as though a sluice, to my great joy .^ This
is, as he says, a Bdeliverance^ with various phases. These disparate impressions come
into sharp focus a little later in the narrative, when he sees himself explicitly as Ban old
foetus now^ whom his mother will Bdrop […] with the help of gangrene^ (226). The
narrator of The Unnamable even tells a curious story in which he too makes circular
movements, Blaps^ in a Bkind of inverted spiral^ around the Bbase^ of his family home
in order to Breturn to the fold^, the Bnest [he] should never have left^ (320–21).
The convergences between Beckett’s writing and one isolated testimony from a patient
prove little, of course, although there is a cumulative effect of reading accounts in which
the speakers feel withdrawn from the world not in relation to social anxiety, hostility, or
loneliness but as a result of an indifference so great as to affect time and space perception
(a Bnut in a great and hard shell^, as one patient put it (Minkowski 1970, 284)) and
threaten one’s intentionality. These sensations are strikingly similar to moments of indiffer-
ence—or sudden attachment to unexpected objects—in Beckett’s writing. In his narratives,
indifference goes beyond affect to become a structural principle. Perceptions of time and
space are not so much disordered as reordered in line with a lack of future time
perspective, a saturation of internal space (as Franz Fischer has described schizophrenia
quoted in Minkowski 1970, 275) and an experience of depersonalization all characteristic
of psychotic disorders (although also found in other conditions). It is very difficult for
either clinician or reader of Beckett to have any subjective understanding of what
Minkowski’s observation that Bthe words BI exist^ do not have a precise sense for him^
could mean. Beckett’s writing may help us to some awareness of this predicament.
That there are similarities between the experience of a series of increasingly abstract
fictional narrators and that of real individuals is of course of limited significance in the
clinical sphere. It may be, also, that it takes the later theatrical works to give a concrete
sense of the phenomenological experience of some of the features discussed. The
imaginative exercise that contemplates the attitudes depicted in the Trilogy may be
predominantly a formal rather than an affective one. There is something suggestive,
however, about the concern of Beckett’s work with a level of awareness below the
Cartesian consciousness, and a disruption to ipseity that affects cognitive, somatic and
ontological aspects of being in the world. The link Beckett draws between these formal
disruptions and the condition of indifference, in particular, mirrors in an intriguing
fashion the links drawn in schizophrenia research between (negative) anhedonia and
both cognitive disorganization and perceptual disturbance. These may not be clinical
insights, but they are imaginative possibilities that both clinician and scholar could
productively entertain.
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Endnotes
1 Beckett also spent some time in a letter to the German translator ofMolloy, Erich Franzen, on 17 February 1954
explaining this term with reference to the Oxford English Dictionary, the pathologist Friedrich Henle and the
psychologist Wilhelm Wundt (Beckett 2011, 458–460).
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